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a b s t r a c t
Motivated by the increasing interest of the Computer Science community in the study
and understanding of non-cooperative systems, we present a novel model for formalizing
the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view of the consequences of their
actions. This approach yields a framework creating new equilibria, which we call Second
Order equilibria, starting from a ground set of traditional ones. By applying our approach
to pure Nash equilibria, we define the set of Second Order pure Nash equilibria and present
their applications to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, to an instance of Braess’s Paradox in the
Wardropmodel and to the KP model with identical machines.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Central to the theory and study of multiplayer non-cooperative games is the notion of Nash equilibrium [39,40], due
to its ability to model the rational behavior of selfish agents. All the agents (players) participating in a game have a set of
strategies they can adopt and, for any combination of the strategies adopted by everyone, they obtain a certain payoff. ANash
equilibrium is a particular combination of strategies such that none of the players can improve her payoff by changing her
strategy. It is well known that Nash equilibria fail in optimizing the overall satisfaction of the players in several games, the
pragmatic example being the Prisoner’s Dilemma. One of the reasons for this suboptimality is that players always perform
deviations from a particular strategy onlymotivated by a transient improvement on their payoffs, without consideringwhat
will be their final payoffs when the game eventually reaches a Nash equilibrium.
This observation naturally yields the question whether an agent taking decisions only based on what will be their short
term consequences without considering what these decisions will cause tomorrow can be really considered a rational one.
A partial answer to this question has been given in Game Theory’s literature through the definition of repeated games. The
general idea repeated games are based on is that the real life is neither a one-shot gamenor a disconnected set of such games,
but it is indeed a bigger game in which what a player does early can influence what others choose to do later on; in other
words, repetition is able to embed in the game the notion of reputation of a player. When engaged in a repeated situation,
players must consider not only their short term gains but also their long term payoffs since other players may be able to
deter them from exploiting their short term advantage by threatening punishment reducing their long term payoffs. Such a
view point, however, can usually give benefits only when the game is repeated an arbitrarily number of times, unknown to
the players. Moreover, it cannot be directly applied to a simple one-shot game.
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Some efforts towards the characterization of equilibria for farsighted players were produced in the 80s through the
definitions of non-myopic equilibria [12] and extended non-myopic equilibria [29]. However, as we will discuss later, these
approaches suffer of serious limitations.
In this paper we propose a novel model for formalizing the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view
of the consequences of their deviations. Such an extended rationality, which can be used in any one-shot game, defines
a framework yielding a new notion of equilibria which we call Second Order equilibria. They can be based upon different
traditional non-cooperative equilibria. Throughout the paper we will deal with Second Order pure Nash equilibria leaving
the discussion of other extensions to future works. These equilibria share some similarities with the notion of purely non-
cooperative farsighted stable sets, an interesting concept, recently presented in [38] and based on the notion of stable set
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in [48], for modeling farsighted behavior in the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
game.
Games, equilibria and optimality
A strategic game G = (P, Si∈P , ωi∈P) is defined as follows. There is a set P of n players. Any player pi ∈ P has a set of
strategies Si and the set S = S1 × · · · × Sn is called the set of all possible states of the game. The payoff function ωi : S → ℜ
defines the cost1 that player pi has to incur when the game is on state s ∈ S. Usually, each game has an associated global
function γ : S → ℜ, called the social function, that is required to be optimized.
Let s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) and s′ = (s1, . . . , s′i, . . . , sn) be two states of G such thatωi(s′) < ωi(s). We call the transition
of game G from s to s′ an improving step performed by player pi. A pure Nash equilibrium is a state in which no player
possesses an improving step. Unfortunately, pure Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist for all games, thus Nash himself
generalized this definition by introducing the concept of mixed strategy. A mixed strategy for player pi is a probability
distribution on the set of strategies Si. The payoff obtained by pi is now defined as the expected value of the related random
variable and the definition of mixed Nash equilibrium is obtained consequently. The property of mixed Nash equilibria,
stated by Nash’s famous Theorem, is that they exist for any finite game. However, there are cases in which the use of mixed
strategies is unrealistic or unacceptable. Throughout the paper we will only deal with pure Nash equilibria and will refer to
them simply as Nash equilibria.
The evolution of a game G resulting from the interactions among players performing improving steps can be easily
captured by a graph GG = (N, A), called the state graph of G, where N = S and A is such that there exists an edge between s
and s′ if and only if there exists an improving step from s to s′. An important issue related to the notion of Nash equilibrium
is that of convergence towards such an equilibrium point, also called finite improvement path property. A game G is said to
be convergent if for any s ∈ S, any sequence of improving steps starting from s ends in a Nash equilibrium, or, analogously,
G does not admit an infinite sequence of improving steps. By using the representation of G through its state graph, we have
that G is convergent if and only if GG is acyclic. The notion of state graph and convergence is of fundamental importance
in those games arising in highly dynamic systems, where players frequently enter and leave the game thus keeping it in a
continuous phase of evolution towards a Nash equilibrium. As wewill see later on, the state graph, with its ability to capture
the game’s dynamic, plays a crucial role in our model.
Two metrics have been introduced in the literature in order to capture the loss of optimality yielded by non-cooperative
equilibria, that is the price of anarchy [41] and the price of stability [2]. Let N (G) be the set of equilibria of game G and s∗
be a state optimizing the social function γ . The price of anarchy of G is defined as PoA(G) = maxs∈N (G) γ (s)γ (s∗) , while the price
of stability of G is defined as PoS(G) = mins∈N (G) γ (s)γ (s∗) .
Repeated games
The basis of repeated games were posed in [4,34,46]. Consider a game G, which we will call the stage game. The
repeated game obtained from G is defined in the following way. The stage game is played at each discrete time period
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T and at the end of each period, all players observe the realized states. The game is finitely repeated if
T < ∞ and is infinitely repeated otherwise. Let st = (st1, . . . , stn) be the state realized at period t (and so sti is the strategy
played by player pi in that period), and denote the initial history by h0. A history of the repeated game in time period t ≥ 1
is denoted by ht and is simply the sequence of the realized states from all periods before t , that is, ht = (s0, s1, . . . , st−1).
Let H t = (S)t be the space of all possible period-t histories. After any nonterminal history, all players pi ∈ P simultaneously
choose a strategy si ∈ Si. Because every player observes ht , a pure strategy for player pi in the repeated game is a sequence of
functions, fi(ht) : H t → Si, that assign possible period-t histories ht ∈ H t to strategies si ∈ Si. That is, fi(ht) denotes a strategy
si for player pi after history ht . So, a strategy for player pi in the repeated game becomes fi = (fi(h0), fi(h1), . . . , fi(hT ))where
it may well be the case that T = ∞. We now define the players’ payoff functions for infinitely repeated games (for finitely
repeated games, the payoffs are usually taken to be the time average of the per-period payoffs). Since the only terminal
histories are the infinite ones and because each period’s payoff is the payoff from the stage game, we must describe how
players evaluate infinite streams of payoffs of the form (ωi(s0), ωi(s1), . . .). There are several alternative specifications in the
literature but we shall focus on the case where players discount future utilities using a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Player pi’s
payoff for the infinite sequence (s0, s1, . . .) is given by the discounted sum of per-period payoffs: ui = (1−δ)∑∞t=0 δtωi(st).
1 In the case inwhich the payoffs represent a benefit for the players, one can always be consistent with this definition by changing the signs of the values.
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Network games and selfish routing
In recent years a considerable research effort has been devoted to the estimation of the price of anarchy of different
network games. The reasons for such an interest come from the affirmation of the Internet and, in general, of huge
unregulated networks,where the traffic generated by the users is not controlled by some central authority, but it is rather the
outcome resulting from the interaction of the users when routing their traffic selfishly and independently on the network.
Two major models have been deeply investigated by researchers: the KP model [32] and the Wardrop model [17,49], both
being convergent games.
In the KP model there are n players andm parallel links. Each player owns a certain unsplittable traffic andwants to route
it through one of the links. This game can also be interpreted as the non-cooperative version of the problem of scheduling
n jobs on m parallel machines. The payoff obtained by a player is the completion time of the chosen machine. The social
function is themakespan, that is themaximumcompletion time of all themachines. Thismodel has been extensively studied
in [15,16,18,20–22,25,31,32,36,37].
In theWardropmodel there are infinitely many players who want to route their traffic over an arbitrary network. There
is a convex latency function associated with each link which is defined in terms of its load. The traffic can be split into
arbitrary pieces each being handled by a selfish player, so that unregulated traffic can be modelled as a network flow. The
payoff obtained by a player is the sum of the latencies experienced on the edges she uses. The social function is the sum of
the products between the payoff of each player and the amount of traffic she owns. TheWardropmodel can also be seen as
a congestion game [42] where all the players own the same infinitesimal small amount of traffic. This model was defined
in [49] and then studied in [6,7,11,17]. Recent papers devoted to the study of its price of anarchy include [43–45].
Some other works, which have dealt with the study of the price of anarchy of pure and/or mixed Nash equilibria in
different network games, can be found in [3,8–10,19,23,24,35].
Our contribution
Critics and improvements upon the classical notion of pure Nash equilibria have had different targets such as existence,
as in the case of correlated and sink equilibria, stability, as in the case of stable equilibria and stochastic adjustment models,
irrationality, as in the case of perfect and sequential equilibria, and need of complete information, as in the case of Bayesian
equilibria.
Our model of rationality defines agents taking into account the long term effects of their choices even during a one-shot
game. An agent knows that she is part of a multiplayer game and also knows that the game will not stop right after she has
performed an improving step. Assume that in state s player pi possesses an improving step and that, if she performs such
a move, a sequence of improvements begins leading the game toward a Nash equilibrium s′. In this scenario, pi is mostly
interested in comparing the payoff she is experiencing in s with the one she can get at s′. The idea is that, if ωi(s′) is worse
thanωi(s), pi is damaged by the consequences of her improving step, hence she has better not to perform it.Whenmore than
just one equilibrium can be reached from a particular state, by following a classical worst-case analysis, we assume that the
agentwill compare the current statewith the equilibriumyielding theworst payoff for her. Such a viewpoint is clearly based
upon the definition of a ground set of equilibria the agentswill compare a generic statewith. According to these comparisons,
if an agent detects a dangerous improving step, she will never perform it, hence the state graph of the game will be pruned
by removing all such improving steps. Informally speaking, since the degree of the graph decreases, it may be the case that
new sinks in the graph emerge, thus generating new equilibria. This processmay be iterated recursively until a fixed point is
reached and the final set of desired equilibria is created.We call such a set the set of Second Order equilibria. Using different
definitions of equilibrium for defining the ground set, we can achieve different sets of Second Order equilibria. In this paper
we concentrate our attention on the definition and the evaluation of Second Order Nash equilibria, that is with a ground set
given by the set of Nash equilibria. In particular, we present applications of these equilibria to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to an
instance of Braess’s Paradox [11] in theWardropmodel and to the KP model with identical machines.
Related works
Other equilibrium concepts have been introduced and studied in the literature. We recall here perfect equilibria [47],
sequential equilibria [33], stable equilibria [30], stochastic adjustment models [28], correlated equilibria [5], Bayesian
equilibria [27] and, recently, sink equilibria [26]. In particular, correlated and sink equilibria are generalizations ofmixed and
pure Nash equilibria respectively, while the others are refinements of mixed (and consequently also pure) Nash equilibria.
Farsighted players were first introduced in [12] for 2-player games in which each player has exactly two strategies, i.e.,
the most basic case of non-cooperative games. It is postulated that, when a player (let us say the row player) contemplates
a departure from a state s, she considers first her own move, then the column player’s response, then her counter-response
and so on, in a strictly alternating sequence. Such a subgame is called the departure game for the row player starting from s.
If the departure game ends at a state whose payoff for the row player is not greater than her payoff in s, s is declared to be
non-myopically stable for the row player. A profile is a non-myopic equilibrium if it is non-myopically stable for both the
row and the column player. However, no specific rules are given in order to determine the final state of a departure game,
except for the case in which the player who is asked to move is already at one of her most preferred states (i.e., states giving
her the best possible payoff). In all the other cases in which this situation does not happen, the initial state s from which
the departure game generates is not eligible to be declared non-myopically stable. This idea was extended in [29], where
V. Bilò, M. Flammini / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 2296–2311 2299
backward inductionwas used to obtain an non-empty set of states representing the solution of each departure game. A state
s is declared to be well determined for the row player if all arbitrarily long departure games starting from s have the same
unique final outcome F(s). The state s is extended non-myopically stable for the row player if it is well determined for such
a player and F(s) = s. Again, s is an extended non-myopic equilibrium if it is extended non-myopically stable for both the
row and the column player. However, there might be cases in which none of the states of the game is well determined for
both players, as well as cases in which for each state s which is well determined for both players, it holds F(s) ≠ s. Finally
[1] extended the approach in [29] to the case of repeated games by showing examples of extended farsighted behavior
applied to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and to the Matching Pennies games, but without developing a formal general theory for
this model.
A more interesting and general approach can be found in [38], in which the notion of purely non-cooperative farsighted
stable set is presented as a solution concept for the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. To this aim, a state y is said to indirectly
dominate a state x if there exists a sequence of states starting with x and ending with y such that each state is obtained from
the previous one after the deviation (not necessarily an improving one) of a player and the payoff each deviating player gets
in the previous state is higher than the payoff she gets in y. Thus, each deviation is an improving one when compared with
y, i.e., the final state of the sequence. A subset of states K is called a purely non-cooperative farsighted stable set if, for each
pair of states x, y ∈ K , neither x indirectly dominates y nor y indirectly dominates x and for each state x /∈ K , there exists
y ∈ K such that y indirectly dominates x.
Finally, farsighted equilibria are defined and analyzed in [13] for keyword auctions. In such a setting, because of the
particular nature of the game, the classical notion of pure Nash equilibrium reveals to be not completely satisfactory. In fact,
once fixed the strategies adopted by the other players, a given player usually has an infinite number of best responses, i.e.
possible bids falling in a continuous range of values. Because of this, the player can look ahead and choose, among all the
possible equivalent bids, the one which will possibly trigger a sequence of reactions by the other players leading to a final
gain for her without risking to get a lower utility.
Comparison with previous works and significance
What makes our approach different from the one yielded by repeated games is that the awareness of a long term
disadvantage already emerges in a one-shot game, without the need of resorting to repetition. In this latter case, in fact,
disadvantages may occur for a player as a consequence of the bad reputation shemade of herself in early stages of the game.
Moreover, a change in the definition of available strategies and payoff functions needs to be introduced in order to comply
with the definitions characterizing repeated games. In ourmodel, on the contrary, a player looks to the disadvantages which
may occur even during the evolution of a one-shot game as a consequence of the sequence of improving steps she can create
with her first defection.
The notion of non-myopic equilibrium, as well as its extensions, heavily relies on the simple structure of the analyzed
games. In fact, generalizations of these concepts to n-player gameswith arbitrary number of strategies per player seem to be
not easily achievable.Moreover, even in their basic cases of definitions, these farsighted equilibria are not always completely
characterized. Our Second Order pure Nash equilibria, instead, are well defined and do always exist in any convergent game.
Purely non-cooperative farsighted stable sets share some ideas with our notion of Second Order pure Nash equilibria,
however, they produce incomparable outcomes, since it is possible to provide examples of Second Order Nash equilibria
not belonging to the purely non-cooperative farsighted stable set as well as states belonging to the purely non-cooperative
farsighted stable set which are not Second Order Nash equilibria. The main reason for such a difference is caused by the
fact that we rely our notion of dominance on sequences of improving deviations, i.e., the players continue to act in a purely
myopic selfish manner: their farsightedness just refrain them from following illusory improving deviations. In the model of
[38], instead, players are evenwilling to suffer a loss in the brief term if this can give them an improvement in the long term.
Both these approaches are clearly reasonable; we argue that ours is more appropriate when considering an evolutionary
game which can be stopped at any time, or after the players have performed a certain number of deviations, and these
information about the game’s duration are unknown to the players.
Paper organization
In the next section we give the formal definition of Second Order Nash equilibria. In Section 3 we illustrate how they
apply to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and also give a brief comparison with the approach of repeated games. In Section 4
we discuss applications of our Second Order Nash equilibria to the two main models for selfish routing, that is, theWardrop
model and the KP model. In Section 5 we introduce other possible models of farsighted selfish agents and finally, in the last
section we give conclusive remarks and open questions.
2. Second Order Nash equilibria
We define our notion of farsightedness in the following way. Consider an integer k ≥ 0, a state s and a player i who can
perform an improving step in s leading the game to a new state s′. If there exists a pure Nash equilibrium s′′ which can be
reached from s′ after k improving steps, and such that ωi(s) < ωi(s′′), then player i has no convenience in leading the game
from s to s′. If these conditions hold for all possible states s′ which can be reached from s after an improving step performed
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by player i, then we say that s is stable for player i with respect to pure Nash equilibria when considering a horizon of k
improving steps. If such a stability holds for each player i who can perform an improving step in s, we say that s is stable
with respect to pure Nash equilibria when considering a horizon of k improving steps. But now we have new equilibria
other than pure Nash ones in our game and so we can no longer restrict ourselves to pure Nash equilibria when comparing
the payoffs of a given state s with those of all the equilibria which can be reached from s′ after player i has performed an
improving step leading the game from s to s′. The correct notion of stability, in fact, can only be achieved by making our
definition recursive, i.e., by using the set of equilibria we are currently defining as the set of stable states to compare the
payoffs of a given state with.
To this aim, we introduce the following definitions and notation. We first propose a generalization of the state graph
related to a game G. Given a set of equilibrium states E ⊆ S, let GG,E = (N, A) be the directed graph in which N = S and A
is such that there exists an edge between s and s′ if and only if there exists an improving step from s to s′ and s /∈ E. Clearly,
GG,∅ coincides with the state graph GG. If pi is the unique player changing her strategy from s to s′, we label the arc ⟨s, s′⟩
with the index i.
We define ρE(s)ki as the set of all the states of G that can be reached starting from s by following a path of length at most
k whose first arc is labelled with index i in the graph GG,E . The set ρE(s)k = ni=1 ρE(s)ki will denote the set of all the states
that can be reached from s by following a path of length at most k in the graph GG,E . When E = ∅, we will simply remove
the subscript E from the notation. We also define P(s) as the set of players that can perform an improving step starting from
state s.
We now give a recursive definition of the new set of equilibria that will be further clarified in the following.
Definition 1. Let G be a convergent game. The set Nk(G) = {s ∈ S : ∀pi ∈ P(s) and ∀s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i , ∃s′′ ∈ Nk(G) such that
s′′ ∈ ρNk(G)(s′)k and ωi(s) < ωi(s′′)} is the set of all the Second Order k-Nash equilibria of game G, for any integer k ≥ 0.
Intuitively, this rather involved definition says that a state s is a Second Order k-Nash equilibrium, for some integer k ≥ 0,
if all the players who can perform an improving step in s would experience, in one of the Second Order k-Nash equilibria
resulting from an evolutive process of at most k improving steps taking place after their first defection, a payoff which is
worse than the one they get in state s. Such a definition is clearly recursive. However, in the following we show that it is
well posed, in the sense that it admits a unique set of solutions or a fixed point. First of all, we prove that N0(G) coincides
with the set of the Nash equilibria of G and that each Nash equilibrium is a Second Order k-Nash equilibrium, for any integer
k ≥ 1.
Lemma 1. N0(G) = {s ∈ S : s is a Nash equilibrium} and N0(G) ⊆ Nk(G), for any integer k ≥ 1.
Proof. Let s be a Nash equilibrium. Since P(s) = ∅, we have that s trivially belongs to Nk(G) for any integer k ≥ 0. Now
consider a state s ∈ N0(G) and suppose that s is not a Nash equilibrium. Consider a player pi ∈ P(s) and a state s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i .
Since k = 0,we have thatρNk(G)(s′)k = {s′}, thus, in order for s to verify Definition 1, itmust be s′ ∈ N0(G) andωi(s) < ωi(s′).
But this last inequality contradicts the fact that s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i , thus N0(G) contains only Nash equilibria. 
We now define an algorithm constructing a set of states N˜k(G) that we will after show to coincide with Nk(G). To this
aim, we first introduce some necessary notation. Given a directed graph G = (N, A) and a set of vertices T ⊆ N , we define
leaves(T ) as the maximal subset of T such that for any s ∈ leaves(T ) and s′ ∈ T there exists no (s, s′)-directed path in G.
Lemma 2. For any acyclic directed graph G = (N, A) and any non-empty subset of vertices T ⊆ N, leaves(T ) is unique and
leaves(T ) ≠ ∅.
Proof. Since G is acyclic, there exists a lexicographic ordering on its node set N . This implies that leaves(T ) ≠ ∅. Now
consider two sets L = leaves(T ) and L′ = leaves(T ) such that L ≠ L′. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there
exists a vertex s ∈ L \ L′. By the definition of leaves(T ), there exists no (s, s′)-directed path in G for any s′ ∈ T . This means
that L′ ∪ {s} ⊆ leaves(T ) thus contradicting the maximality of L′. 
As a consequence of the above lemma, the following corollary immediately follows.
Corollary 1. For any acyclic directed graph G = (N, A), leaves(T ) = ∅ if and only if T = ∅.
The algorithm Construct N˜k(G) for determining N˜k(G) is defined as follows.
Construct N˜k(G):
1. N˜k(G)← N0(G)
2. T (k)← {s ∈ S \ N˜k(G) : ∀pi ∈ P(s) and ∀s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i , ∃s′′ ∈ N˜k(G) such that s′′ ∈ ρN˜k(G)(s′)k and ωi(s) < ωi(s′′)}
3. if T (k) ≠ ∅
(a)N˜k(G)← N˜k(G) ∪ leaves(T (k))
(b)goto 2
4. else return N˜k(G)
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Clearly, since at each step N˜k(G) grows, the algorithm terminates. Moreover, because of Lemma 2, we have that N˜k(G) is
unique. In the following theoremwe show that Nk(G) = N˜k(G) for any integer k ≥ 0, thus proving the uniqueness of Nk(G).
Theorem 1. Let G be a convergent game then Nk(G) = N˜k(G) for any integer k ≥ 0.
Proof. The case k = 0 can be easily shown by noting that N˜0(G) = {s ∈ S : s is a Nash equilibrium}. In order to prove
the general claim consider the state graph GG. Since G is convergent, GG is acyclic. For any N˜k(G) satisfying Definition 1, let
T = Nk(G) ∪ N˜k(G) \ Nk(G) ∩ N˜k(G) and consider a state s ∈ leaves(T ) in GG. Because of Lemma 1 and line 1 of Construct
N˜k(G), s cannot be a Nash equilibrium. We have to distinguish between two cases:
• s ∈ Nk(G) \ N˜k(G). This means that
1. ∀pi ∈ P(s) and ∀s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i , ∃s′′ ∈ Nk(G) such that s′′ ∈ ρNk(G)(s′)k and ωi(s) < ωi(s′′) and,
2. ∃pi ∈ P(s) and ∃s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i such that ∀s′′ ∈ N˜k(G) such that s′′ ∈ ρN˜k(G)(s′)k it holds ωi(s) ≥ ωi(s′′).
Consider the pair (pi, s′) verifying condition 2 and a state s′′ verifying condition 1 for the pair (pi, s′). If s′′ ∈ N˜k(G), since
s′′ violates condition 2, there must be s′′ ∈ ρNk(G)(s′)k and s′′ /∈ ρN˜k(G)(s′)k. This implies the existence of at least a state
s ∈ N˜k(G) belonging to a directed path form s′ to s′′ in GG such that s /∈ Nk(G). Such an s belongs to T and there exists an
(s, s) directed path in GG. Thus s cannot belong to leaves(T ). If s′′ /∈ N˜k(G), then s′′ ∈ T and there exists an (s, s′′) directed
path in GG. Thus s again cannot belong to leaves(T ).
• s ∈ N˜k(G) \ Nk(G). This case can be proved symmetrically by exchanging the role of Nk(G) and N˜k(G) in the previous
one.
We have shown leaves(T ) = ∅. As a consequence of Corollary 1 we have that T = ∅ and this holds if and only if
Nk(G) = N˜k(G), hence the claim. 
In the following lemmawe show that there exists a value k∗ for which all the sets Nk(G) become the same for any k ≥ k∗.
Lemma 3. Let G be a convergent game and let k∗ be the diameter of GG minus 1, then Nk
∗
(G) = Nk(G) for any integer k ≥ k∗.
Proof. By exploiting Theorem 1, it suffices to show that N˜k(G) = N˜k∗(G) for any integer k ≥ k∗. Considering algorithm
Construct N˜k(G), this immediately follows by observing that for every integer k ≥ k∗, T (k) = T (k∗) and thus leaves(T (k)) =
leaves(T (k∗)). 
We can now define the general notion of Second Order Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2. Given a convergent game G, each state s ∈ Nk∗(G) =def N(G) is a Second Order Nash equilibrium.
As a consequence of Lemma 1 we have that the introduction of our notion of extended rationality through the definition
of Second Order Nash equilibria is able to enrich the set of equilibria states of a given non-cooperative game. If one looks to
the dynamic evolution of a game and, in particular, to its representation by means of the state graph, it is thus possible
to appreciate that for any s ∈ N(G) \ N0(G) all the improving steps possessed by the set of players P(s) are never
performedwhen the game is on state s. By exploiting the same relationships relating the notions of improving step and Nash
equilibrium,we can define a SecondOrder improving step for player pi as an improving step (s, s′) such that∀s′′ ∈ N(G)with
s′′ ∈ ρN(G)(s′)k∗ it holdsωi(s) ≥ ωi(s′′) and then define also the notion of Second Order state graph. Clearly, wewill have that
a SecondOrderNash equilibrium is a state admitting no SecondOrder improving steps or, analogously, any sink in the Second
Order state graph. The importance of these definitions can be appreciated when analyzing the problem of convergence
towards equilibria states. In fact, by using the extended rationality,we can think of using the SecondOrder state graph, rather
than the traditional one, in order to model the dynamic evolution of the game during time. This could be quantitatively
studied in order to understand whether extended rationality may yield faster convergence and/or convergence towards
better equilibria (see, for instance the example in Section 4.2).
3. An illustrating example: the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Prisoner’s Dilemma). Two suspects in a major crime are held in separate cells. There is enough evidence to convict each
of them of a minor offense, but not enough evidence to convict either of them of the major crime unless one of them acts as
an informer against the other (finks). If they both stay quiet, each will be convicted of the minor offense and spend one year
in prison. If one and only one of them finks, he will be freed and used as a witness against the other, who will spend three
years in prison. If they both fink, each will spend two years in prison.
This situation can be modelled as a strategic game in which we have two players p1 and p2. The set of strategies is the
same for both of them and is Si = {Quiet, Fink}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, the payoff function is shown in the table depicted in
Fig. 1.








Fig. 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
As can be easily seen by inspection, the game admits one Nash equilibrium represented by the state {Fink, Fink}. This
non-cooperative solution contrasts with the state {Quiet,Quiet} in which both players enjoy a better payoff. Based on this
unrealistic outcome, several critics have been risen to the notion of Nash equilibrium as a meaningful modeling instrument
for rational behavior. However, if the game is repeatedly played by the same two players (Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma




Quiet if aτ = {Quiet,Quiet}, for τ = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1,
Fink otherwise.
This strategywill read: ‘‘begin by cooperating in the first period, then cooperate as long as both players have cooperated in all
previous periods, defect otherwise’’. (This strategy is called the grim-trigger strategy because even one defection performed
by anyone of the two players triggers a retaliation that lasts forever). Consider the case in which RPD is played T <∞ times
and let us evaluate the payoffs of both players in order to detect a Nash equilibrium. It is possible to show that every Nash
equilibrium in this case generates the always Fink outcome. To see this, let s denote some Nash equilibrium. Both players
will Fink in the last period T for any history hT because doing so increases their period-T payoff and because there are no
future periods in which theymight be punished. Since players will always Fink in the last period along the equilibrium path,
if player pi conforms to her equilibrium strategy in period T−1, her opponent will Fink at time T , and therefore player pi has
no incentive not to Fink in T − 1. An induction argument completes the proof. This already shows that modeling farsighted
players through finite repeated games cannot yield cooperation among the players.
The set of equilibria of an infinitely repeated game can be very different from that of the corresponding finitely repeated
game because players can use self-enforcing rewards and punishments that do not unravel from the terminal date. In
particular, because there is no fixed last period of the game, in which both players will surely Fink, in the RPD game players
may be able to sustain cooperation by the threat of ‘‘punishment’’ in case of defection. While in the case of finitely repeated
games a strategy can explicitly state what to do in each of the T periods, specifying strategies for infinitely repeated games
is trickier because it must specify actions after all possible histories, and there is an infinite number of these. To calculate the
payoffs, we need to specify the strategies for both players. For example, it is quite easy to see that the always Fink strategy
remains aNash equilibrium for both players. However, let us check amore significant case, that is, whether the state inwhich
both players adopt the grim-trigger strategy is a Nash equilibrium. If both players follow this strategy, the outcome will be
cooperation in each period whose average discounted value is (1 − δ)∑∞t=0 δtωi({Quiet,Quiet}) = (1 − δ)∑∞t=0 δt = 1.
Consider the best possible deviation for p1. For such a deviation to be profitable, it must produce a sequence of states which
has at least a defection by some player in some period. If p2 follows grim-trigger, she will not defect until p1 defects, which
implies that a profitable deviation must involve a defection by p1. Let τ be the first period in which p1 defects. Since p2
follows grim-trigger, shewill play Fink fromperiod τ+1 onward. Therefore, the best deviation for p1 generates the following
sequence of states:
{Quiet,Quiet}, . . . , {Quiet,Quiet}  
τ times
, {Fink,Quiet}, {Fink, Fink}, {Fink, Fink}, . . .
which generates the following sequence of payoffs for p1:
1, . . . , 1  
τ times
, 0, 2, 2, . . .
The average discounted value of this sequence is
















= 1− δτ + 2δτ+1.
Solving the following inequality for δ yields the discount factor necessary to sustain cooperation:
1− δτ + 2δτ+1 ≥ 1.
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Fig. 2. The state graph of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
That is, for any δ ≥ 12 , i.e., if the players are patient enough, then the outcome of the situation in which both players
adopt the grim-trigger strategy, yielding cooperation in all periods, is a Nash equilibrium for the infinitely RPD.
On the other hand, it can be easily shown thatN(G) = {{Fink, Fink}, {Quiet,Quiet}}. In factwe have {Fink, Fink} ∈ N(G) as
{Fink, Fink} ∈ N0(G) and {Quiet,Quiet} ∈ N(G) since, as can be seen in Fig. 2, {Fink, Fink} ∈ ρ({Quiet,Quiet})1i for i ∈ {1, 2}
and ωi({Fink, Fink}) > ωi({Quiet,Quiet}) for i ∈ {1, 2} and no other state belongs to N(G).
This shows that our notion of farsighted behavior modelled through Second Order equilibria can yield the same outcome
of the model of infinitely repeated games and has the advantage of not changing the nature of the game which remains
uneffected in the set of strategies as well as in the payoff functions of the players.
4. Some applications of Second Order Nash equilibria
The power of Second Order equilibria lies in the fact that they introduce a sort of cooperation among the players in the
following particular sense: the players are interested in not hurting each other, that is, in not leading the game to a state
that is worse than the current one for each of them. By quoting a classical Italian proverb we can say that they ‘‘do not awake
the sleeping dog’’.
Quantitatively speaking, the effects of the introduction of Second Order Nash equilibria are the following.
Proposition 1. In any game G, the price of stability of Second Order k-Nash equilibria is not worse than that of Nash equilibria,
while the price of anarchy of Nash equilibria is not worse than that of Second Order k-Nash equilibria, for any k ≥ 1.
Proof. Since N0(G) ⊆ Nk(G) for any k ≥ 1, the claim holds trivially. 
Proposition 2. In any game G, the maximum number of steps needed to reach a Second Order k-Nash equilibrium is not greater
than the maximum number of steps needed to reach a Nash equilibrium, while the minimum number of steps needed to reach a
Nash equilibrium is not greater than the minimum number of steps needed to reach a Second Order k-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that the set of edges (and, consequently, the set of paths) in the Second Order state
graph of G is a subset of the set of edges in the state graph of G. 
This means that, if we agree on the fact that ‘‘in the real world’’ selfish players possess the extended rationality
characterizing our notion of Second Order Nash equilibria, worst-case convergence towards an equilibrium state may be
better, while best-case convergencemay beworse; on the contrary best-case outcomes are expected to be even better, while
worst-case ones are expected to be even worse than the ones obtained through the use of Nash equilibria. In particular, as
we have seen in the previous section, a good behavior of Second Order Nash equilibria can be appreciated when applied
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We show in what follows that another well-known paradox in Game Theory, namely, Braess’s
paradox in theWardropmodel can be avoided with the help of our extended rationality.
4.1. Braess’s paradox
Suppose one unit of traffic needs to be routed from s to t in the first network of Fig. 3, where each edge is labelled with
its latency function of the link congestion x. In the unique flow at Nash equilibrium, which coincides with the optimal flow,
half of the traffic takes the upper path and the other half travels along the lower path, and thus all agents are routed on
a path of latency 32 . Next suppose a fifth edge of latency 0 (independent of the congestion) is added to the network, with
the result shown in Fig. 3(b). The optimal flow is unaffected by this augmentation (there is no way to use the new link to
decrease the total latency) while in the new (unique) flow at Nash equilibrium all traffic follows the path s → v → w→ t;
here, the latency experienced by each agent is 2. Thus, the intuitively helpful (or at least innocuous) action of adding a new
zero-latency link may negatively impact on the payoffs of all of the agents.














l(x) = 1l(x) = x
l(x) = x
(a) Before. (b) After.
Fig. 3. Braess’s Paradox.
LetΠ1 be the path s → v → t ,Π2 be the path s → w→ t ,Π3 be the path s → v → w→ t and define fi as the amount
of flow routed on pathΠi. We can thus denote a state s ∈ S as s = (f1, f2, f3) by specifying the amount of flow routed on the
three different paths.
Since ourmodel of SecondOrder equilibria, based on the structure of the state graph, is clearly a discrete one, we consider
the instance of Braess’s Paradox in which the unitary flow representing the traffic on the network is split into infinitely
many atomic pieces all having the same infinitesimal dimension ϵ > 0 and denote this game by Gϵ . This assumption does
not change the properties of the Wardrop model as well as those of Braess’s Paradox instance G since it is easy to see that
G = limϵ→0 Gϵ . In particular, the set ofNash equilibria becomesN0(Gϵ) = {(0, 0, 1), (ϵ, 0, 1−ϵ), (0, ϵ, 1−ϵ), (ϵ, ϵ, 1−2ϵ)}
which collapses to N0(G) = {(0, 0, 1)}when ϵ tends to zero.
The main result of this section is the characterization of the set of Second Order Nash equilibria for Gϵ .
The following lemma will be widely used inside the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Given two states s = (f1, f2, f3) and s′′ = (f1 − δ1(s, s′′), f2 − δ2(s, s′′), f3 + δ1(s, s′′) + δ2(s, s′′)) and a directed
(s, s′′)-path in GGϵ whose first arc is labelled with pi, it holds ωi(s) < ωi(s′′) if and only if
f2 < δ1(s, s′′)+ δ2(s, s′′), when pi migrates in s fromΠ2 toΠ3; (1)
f2 < f1 + δ2(s, s′′), when f2 > f1 + ϵ and pi migrates in s fromΠ2 toΠ1; (2)
f1 < δ1(s, s′′)+ δ2(s, s′′), when pi migrates in s fromΠ1 toΠ3; (3)
f1 < f2 + δ1(s, s′′),when f1 > f2 + ϵ and pi migrates in s fromΠ1 toΠ2. (4)
Proof. The claim follows directly by evaluating the two payoffs ωi(s) and ωi(s′′) in all the four cases. 
We can now characterize the set of Second Order Nash equilibria for Gϵ .
Theorem 2. N(Gϵ) = N0(Gϵ) ∪ {((ℓ + 3j)ϵ, ℓϵ, 1 − (2ℓ + 3j)ϵ), (ℓϵ, (ℓ + 3j)ϵ, 1 − (2ℓ + 3j)ϵ)|j = 0, . . . , ⌊ 1−4ϵ3ϵ ⌋ and
ℓ = 3, . . . , ⌊ 1−3jϵ2ϵ ⌋}.
Proof. Since no improving step exists in which a player leavesΠ3, we can use Lemma 4 to showwhether or not a state s is a
Second Order Nash equilibrium. In particular, we will show that s is a Second Order Nash equilibrium by comparing it with
all the Second Order Nash equilibria s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ for any player pi ∈ P(s) and s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i , while we will show that s cannot
be a Second Order Nash equilibrium by providing a player pi ∈ P(s), a state s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i and a Second Order Nash equilibria
s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ for which the related inequality given in Lemma 4 is violated. Consider a state s = (f1, f2, f3) ∈ S. We will first
analyze all the states having f1 ≤ 2ϵ or f2 ≤ 2ϵ.
• Case f1 ≥ ϵ and f2 = 0. Choose a player pi routing on Π1 and let s′′ be any Second Order Nash equilibrium such that
s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ where s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i is the state obtained from s when pi migrates from Π1 to Π3. Since δ2(s, s′′) ≤ 0, the
condition f1 < δ1(s, s′′) has to be satisfied when inequality (3) holds. But, since f1 − δ1(s, s′′) ≥ 0 by definition, such a
condition can never hold. Hence the only Second Order Nash equilibria having f2 = 0 are the twoNash equilibria (0, 0, 1)
and (ϵ, 0, 1− ϵ).
• Case f1 = 0 and f2 ≥ ϵ. By a symmetric argument, the only Second Order Nash equilibria having f1 = 0 are the two Nash
equilibria (0, 0, 1) and (0, ϵ, 1− ϵ).
• Case f1 ≥ ϵ and f2 = ϵ. Choose a player pi routing on Π1 and let s′′ be any Second Order Nash equilibrium such that
s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ where s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i is the state obtained from swhen pi migrates fromΠ1 toΠ3. For any such an s′′ it must hold
δ1(s, s′′) < f1 and δ2(s, s′′) ≤ 0, since it is not possible to reach any of the states (ϵ, 0, 1 − ϵ) and (0, ϵ, 1 − ϵ) without
passing through the state (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ). We have δ1(s, s′′) + δ2(s, s′′) < f1 thus inequality (3) can never be satisfied.
Hence the only Second Order Nash equilibrium having f2 = ϵ is the Nash equilibrium (ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ).
• Case f1 = ϵ and f2 ≥ ϵ. By a symmetric argument, the only Second Order Nash equilibrium having f1 = ϵ is the Nash
equilibrium (ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ).
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• Case f1 ≥ 2ϵ and f2 = 2ϵ. Choose a player pi routing on Π1 and let s′′ be any Second Order Nash equilibrium such that
s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ where s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i is the state obtained from s when pi migrates from Π1 to Π3. Again, for any such an s′′
it must hold δ1(s, s′′) ≤ f1 − ϵ and δ2(s, s′′) ≤ ϵ, since it is not possible to reach any of the states (ϵ, 0, 1 − ϵ) and
(0, ϵ, 1− ϵ) without passing through the state (ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ). We have δ1(s, s′′)+ δ2(s, s′′) ≤ f1 thus inequality (3) can
never be satisfied. Hence no Second Order Nash equilibria may exist having f2 = 2ϵ.
• Case f1 = 2ϵ and f2 ≥ 2ϵ. By a symmetric argument, no Second Order Nash equilibria may exist having f1 = 2ϵ.
We show the general claim for the remaining states by induction on j. The basic step is when j = 0. By induction on ℓwe
prove that all the states sℓ = (ℓϵ, ℓϵ, 1 − 2ℓϵ) ∈ N(Gϵ). Consider first of all the state s3 = (3ϵ, 3ϵ, 1 − 6ϵ). Starting from
s3, for any pi ∈ P(s3) migrating to Π3 from either Π1 or Π2, it is possible to create a path of improving steps reaching the
state s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ) and not passing through any other Second Order Nash equilibrium (since all the states in the path
would have either f1 ≤ 2ϵ or f2 ≤ 2ϵ). Since in any case δ1(s3, s′′)+ δ2(s3, s′′) = 4ϵ > 3ϵ, inequalities (1) and (3) are both
satisfied, thus s3 ∈ N(Gϵ).
Now suppose, for the sake of induction, that sr = (rϵ, rϵ, 1 − 2rϵ) ∈ N(Gϵ) for any 3 ≤ r < ℓ and consider the state
sℓ. Let us assume for a while that starting from sℓ, for any pi ∈ P(sℓ) migrating to Π3 from either Π1 or Π2, it is possible
to create a path of improving steps reaching the state s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ) and not passing through any other Second Order
Nash equilibrium. Since in any case δ1(sℓ, s′′) + δ2(sℓ, s′′) = 2(ℓ − 1)ϵ > ℓϵ, we have sℓ ∈ N(Gϵ) provided such a desired
path can be obtained. This task is achieved by considering a sequence of migrations towardsΠ3 so that at each state of the
path the absolute value of the difference between the flow routed onΠ1 and the one routed onΠ2 is equal to either ϵ or 2ϵ.
Any such state cannot be a Second Order Nash equilibrium. In fact, a state s = (fs+ϵ, fs, 1−2fs−ϵ)with fs+ϵ ≤ ℓϵ cannot
belong to N(Gϵ) since by the inductive hypothesis, the state s′ = (fs, fs, 1− 2fs) ∈ N(Gϵ), s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i for some pi ∈ P(s) and
ωi(s) > ωi(s′). Analogously, a state s = (fs + 2ϵ, fs, 1 − 2fs − 2ϵ) with fs + 2ϵ ≤ ℓϵ cannot belong to N(Gϵ) since by the
inductive hypothesis, the state s′ = (fs + ϵ, fs + ϵ, 1− 2fs − 2ϵ) ∈ N(Gϵ), s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i for some pi ∈ P(s) and ωi(s) > ωi(s′).
By symmetry, also the states (fs, fs + ϵ, 1− 2fs − ϵ) and (fs, fs + 2ϵ, 1− 2fs − 2ϵ) cannot belong to N(Gϵ). This completes
the proof of the basic step.
Now suppose for the sake of induction that the claim holds for any 0 ≤ p < j, we have to show that it holds also for the
value j and for any ℓ = 3, . . . , 1−3jϵ2ϵ . We prove it by induction on ℓ.
We have proved that for any state s = (f1, f2, f3), if 0 < |f1− f2| < 3ϵ then s /∈ N(Gϵ). Suppose that for any 0 ≤ p < j, the
state ((ℓ+3p)ϵ, ℓϵ, 1− (2ℓ+3p)ϵ) belongs to N(Gϵ). It is not difficult to see that using the same argument exploited above
together with the inductive hypothesis, it is possible to prove that for any state s = (f1, f2, f3), if 3pϵ < |f1− f2| < 3(p+1)ϵ,
then s /∈ N(Gϵ).
The basic step is when ℓ = 3. Consider the state s = (f1, f2, f3) = ((3+ 3j)ϵ, 3ϵ, 1− (6+ 3j)ϵ). We have to distinguish
among three possible states s′ ∈ ρ(s)1.
1. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates from Π1 to Π2. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that
f ′1 − f ′2 = (2+ 3j)ϵ − 4ϵ = (3j− 2)ϵ = (3(j− 1)+ 1)ϵ. Thus, since 3(j− 1)ϵ < f ′1 − f ′2 < 3jϵ, we have s′ /∈ N(Gϵ). Now
consider the sequence of improving steps starting from s′ obtained by applying the following rule: ‘‘While the flow routed
onΠ2 is strictly greater than ϵ, let a player migrate fromΠ2 toΠ3 and then let a player migrate fromΠ1 toΠ3’’. By doing so,
the difference between the flow routed on Π1 and that routed on Π2 in any state of the sequence will always be equal
to either (3(j − 1) + 1)ϵ or (3(j − 1) + 2)ϵ, thus the created path can never reach a Second Order Nash equilibrium.
When the flow routed onΠ2 reaches the value ϵ we can consider a sequence of migrations fromΠ1 toΠ3 until the state
s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ) is reached. Again, no other Second Order Nash equilibrium is traversed during these migrations. In
this case, since f1 = (3+ 3j)ϵ, f2 = 3ϵ and δ1(s, s′′) = (2+ 3j)ϵ, inequality (4) is satisfied.
2. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates from Π1 to Π3. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that
f ′1 − f ′2 = (2+ 3j)ϵ − 3ϵ = (3j− 1)ϵ = (3(j− 1)+ 2)ϵ. Thus, since 3(j− 1)ϵ < f ′1 − f ′2 < 3jϵ, we have s′ /∈ N(Gϵ). Now
consider the sequence of improving steps starting from s′ obtained by applying the following rule: ‘‘While the flow routed
onΠ2 is strictly greater than ϵ, let a player migrate fromΠ1 toΠ3 and then let a player migrate fromΠ2 toΠ3’’. By doing so,
the difference between the flow routed on Π1 and that routed on Π2 in any state of the sequence will always be equal
to either (3(j − 1) + 1)ϵ or (3(j − 1) + 2)ϵ, thus the created path can never reach a Second Order Nash equilibrium.
When the flow routed onΠ2 reaches the value ϵ we can consider a sequence of migrations fromΠ1 toΠ3 until the state
s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ) is reached. Again, no other Second Order Nash equilibrium is traversed during these migrations. In
this case, since f1 = (3+ 3j)ϵ, δ1(s, s′′) = (2+ 3j)ϵ, and δ2(s, s′′) = 2ϵ inequality (3) is satisfied.
3. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates fromΠ2 toΠ3. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that f ′2 = 2ϵ
then s′ /∈ N(Gϵ) since we have proved that no Second Order Nash equilibria exist whose flow routed onΠ2 is equal to 2ϵ.
Again, we can let one of the two players routing onΠ2 migrate toΠ3 and then consider a sequence of migrations from
Π1 toΠ3 until the state s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1−2ϵ) is reached. In this case, since f2 = 3ϵ, δ1(s, s′′) = (2+3j)ϵ and δ2(s, s′′) = 2ϵ,
inequality (1) is satisfied.
Thus the basic step is proved. Now,we show the inductive step. Assume that the claim holds for any r such that 3 ≤ r < ℓ
and consider the state s = (f1, f2, f3) = ((ℓ+ 3j)ϵ, ℓϵ, 1− (2ℓ+ 3j)ϵ). We have to distinguish among three possible states
s′ ∈ ρ(s)1.
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Fig. 4. Second Order Nash equilibria for Gϵ .
1. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates from Π1 to Π2. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that
f ′1 − f ′2 = (ℓ + 3j − 1)ϵ − (ℓ + 1)ϵ = (3j − 2)ϵ = (3(j − 1) + 1)ϵ. Thus, since 3(j − 1)ϵ < f ′1 − f ′2 < 3jϵ, we
have s′ /∈ N(Gϵ). Now consider the sequence of improving steps starting from s′ obtained by applying the following rule:
‘‘While the flow routed onΠ2 is strictly greater than ϵ, let a player migrate fromΠ2 toΠ3 and then let a player migrate from
Π1 toΠ3’’. By doing so, the difference between the flow routed onΠ1 and that routed onΠ2 in any state of the sequence
will always be equal to either (3(j− 1)+ 1)ϵ or (3(j− 1)+ 2)ϵ, thus the created path can never reach a Second Order
Nash equilibrium. When the flow routed on Π2 reaches the value ϵ we can consider a sequence of migrations from Π1
to Π3 until the state s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ) is reached. Again, no other Second Order Nash equilibrium is traversed during
these migrations. In this case, since f1 = (ℓ+ 3j)ϵ, f2 = ℓϵ and δ1(s, s′′) = (ℓ+ 3j− 1)ϵ, inequality (4) is satisfied.
2. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates from Π1 to Π3. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that
f ′1 − f ′2 = (ℓ + 3j − 1)ϵ − ℓϵ = (3j − 1)ϵ = (3(j − 1) + 2)ϵ. Thus, since 3(j − 1)ϵ < f ′1 − f ′2 < 3jϵ, we have
s′ /∈ N(Gϵ). Now consider the sequence of improving steps starting from s′ obtained by applying the following rule:
‘‘While the flow routed onΠ2 is strictly greater than ϵ, let a player migrate fromΠ1 toΠ3 and then let a player migrate from
Π2 toΠ3’’. By doing so, the difference between the flow routed onΠ1 and that routed onΠ2 in any state of the sequence
will always be equal to either (3(j− 1)+ 1)ϵ or (3(j− 1)+ 2)ϵ, thus the created path can never reach a Second Order
Nash equilibrium. When the flow routed on Π2 reaches the value ϵ we can consider a sequence of migrations from Π1
to Π3 until the state s′′ = (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ) is reached. Again, no other Second Order Nash equilibrium is traversed during
these migrations. In this case, since f1 = (ℓ + 3j)ϵ, δ1(s, s′′) = (ℓ + 3j − 1)ϵ and δ2(s, s′′) = (ℓ − 1)ϵ inequality (3) is
satisfied.
3. s′ is the state obtained from s when a player pi migrates from Π2 to Π3. Such a state s′ = (f ′1, f ′2, f ′3) is such that
f ′1− f ′2 = (ℓ+3j)ϵ− (ℓ−1)ϵ = (3j+1)ϵ. We have s′ /∈ N(Gϵ). In fact, the state s = ((ℓ+3j−1)ϵ, (ℓ−1)ϵ, f ′3) obtained
from s′ by letting a player pi migrate from Π1 to Π3 is a Second Order Nash equilibrium by the inductive hypothesis,
since s = ((p + 3j)ϵ, pϵ, f ′′3 ) with p = ℓ − 1. Now consider the state s˜ = (f˜1, f˜2, f˜3) obtained from s′ by letting a player
migrate from Π1 to Π2. We have f˜1 − f˜2 = (ℓ + 3j − 1)ϵ − ℓϵ = (3j − 1)ϵ = (3(j − 1) + 2)ϵ thus falling into case
2. This means that there exists a path of improving steps ending to the state (ϵ, ϵ, 1 − 2ϵ). In this case, since f2 = ℓϵ,
δ1(s, s′′) = (ℓ+ 3j− 1)ϵ and δ2(s, s′′) = (ℓ− 1)ϵ inequality (1) is satisfied.
We have shown that s ∈ N(Gϵ) and the inductive step is proved. By symmetry, the same result holds also for s =
(ℓϵ, (ℓ+3j)ϵ, 1−(2ℓ+3j)ϵ). This completes the proof sincewe have also shown that no other state can belong toN(G). 
For the ease of understanding, the structure of N(Gϵ) has been depicted in Fig. 4.
As a consequence of Theorem 2, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 2. The price of stability of the Second Order Nash equilibrium for Gϵ is 1.
In this problem, as well as in other non-trivial multiplayer games, we have seen that the structure of the state graph
can be really intricate thus making the definition of Second Order Nash equilibria a very challenging task. In order to ease
the computation one can work on a simplified version of the state graph by considering, for example, the existence of
a particular ordering in which improving steps are performed during the evolution of the game. Such a scenario seems
perfectly reasonable and different ordering strategies can be considered indeed as some sort of coordination mechanisms
[14] that can be adopted during the game in order to lead the players towards a desired behavior.
To this aim consider the following ordering mechanismM: at each state s, the player pi ∈ P(s) using the most congested
path is the one allowed to change her strategy (breaking ties arbitrarily).
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Fig. 5. Second Order Nash equilibria for Gϵ when mechanismM is adopted.
In order to show Theorem 3, we first prove the following simple lemma.
Lemma 5. Let Π be a path on GGϵ in which each improving step consists in a migration towards Π3 and let ωΠr (s) be the
payoff of any player routing his traffic on Πr in any state s ∈ S with r = 1, 2, 3. Then for any two states s = (f1, f2, f3) and
s′ = (f1 − δ1(s, s′), f2 − δ2(s, s′), f3 + δ1(s, s′) + δ2(s, s′)) ∈ Π , it holds ωΠ3(s′) − ωΠr (s) = δ1(s, s′) + δ2(s, s′) − fr , for
r = 1, 2.
Proof. We have ωΠr (s) = 1+ fr + f3 while ωΠ3(s′) = f1 + f2 + 2f3 + δ1(s, s′)+ δ2(s, s′). 
We can state the following result.
Theorem 3. When mechanismM is adopted N(Gϵ) = N0(Gϵ) ∪ {((2i+1 − 1)ϵ, (2i+1 − 1)ϵ, 1 − 2(2i+1 − 1)ϵ)|i = 1, . . .
⌊log2( 1+2ϵ2ϵ )⌋ − 1}.
Proof. Let F = N0(Gϵ) ∪ {((2i+1 − 1)ϵ, (2i+1 − 1)ϵ, 1 − 2(2i+1 − 1)ϵ)|i = 1, . . . ⌊log2( 1+2ϵ2ϵ )⌋ − 1}. Consider a state
s = (fs, fs, 1− 2fs) ∈ F with fs < 1/4 and the state s′ = (2fs + ϵ, 2fs + ϵ, 1− 4fs − 2ϵ) ∈ F . We claim that if s ∈ N(Gϵ) then
also s′ ∈ N(Gϵ). By applying mechanismM, we have that s ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ and the sequence of related improving steps satisfies
the conditions of Lemma 5.Without loss of generality we can suppose that the player pi performing the improving step from
s′ leavesΠ1 in favor ofΠ3. We have ωi(s′) = 2− 2fs − ϵ < ωi(s) = 2− 2fs. Applying Lemma 5, we have that no other state
s′′ may exist on the path between s′ and s in GGϵ such that ωi(s′′) < ωi(s). Hence s′ ∈ N(Gϵ).
We now prove by induction that F ⊆ N(Gϵ). Assume that for the value i the state ((2i+1− 1)ϵ, (2i+1− 1)ϵ, 1− 2(2i+1−
1)ϵ) ∈ N(Gϵ). By using the result just shown above, we have that (2(2i+1−1)ϵ+ϵ, 2(2i+1−1)ϵ+ϵ, 1−4(2i+1−1)ϵ−2ϵ) =
((2i+2 − 1)ϵ, (2i+2 − 1)ϵ, 1 − 2(2i+2 − 1)ϵ) ∈ N(Gϵ) thus showing the claim for the value i + 1. Since for i = 0 the state
(ϵ, ϵ, 1− 2ϵ) ∈ N0(Gϵ) ⊆ F , the inductive argument holds.
Now, in order to show that F = N(Gϵ), consider a state s = (f1, f2, f3) /∈ F such that no other state s′ ∈ N(Gϵ)\F exists on
any path of GGϵ starting from s. Supposewithout loss of generality f1 > f2. By applyingmechanismM, we have that the state
s′ = (f2, f2, 1− 2f2) ∈ ρ(s)k∗ . If s′ ∈ F we have ωi(s) = 1+ f1 + f3 = 2− f2 ≥ 2− 2f2 = ωi(s′), hence s cannot be a Second
Order Nash equilibrium. If s /∈ F , a state s = (fs, fs, 1− 2fs) ∈ F is reached such that fs ≥ f22 . By applying again Lemma 5, we
have that the maximum value of ωi(s) is achieved when fs = f22 . We thus have ωi(s) = 1+ f1 + f3 = 2− f2 ≥ ωi(s), hence
again s cannot be a Second Order Nash equilibrium. 
In Fig. 5 we show the structure of N(Gϵ) in this case. It can be easily noted that the set of Second Order Nash equilibria is
a subset of the one achieved in the general case.
Corollary 3. When mechanismM is adopted the price of stability of the Second Order Nash equilibrium of Gϵ falls in the interval
[1; 1312 ].
Proof. If log2( 1+2ϵ2ϵ ) is an integral number we have that (2
⌊log2( 1+2ϵ2ϵ )⌋ − 1)ϵ = 12 , hence the optimal state ( 12 , 12 , 0) ∈ N(Gϵ)
thus proving the lower bound on the price of stability of the Second Order Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the worst




2 ) ∈ N(Gϵ). In this case we have that the cost of the solution is 138 which compared with
the optimal cost of 32 gives the upper bound of
13
12 on the price of stability. 
Thus, on the one hand the introduction of the ordering mechanism M has simplified the set of Second Order Nash
equilibria, on the other hand it has (slightly) worsened its price of stability.
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Fig. 6. An instance of the load balancing game.
Letting ϵ go to zero we obtain the general version of Braess’s Paradox in the Wardrop model. We argue here that the
results of Corollaries 2 and 3 still hold in this case, since, when ϵ tends to zero, ℓϵ = 12 when j = 0 and ℓ = ⌊ 1−3jϵ2ϵ ⌋ in the
claim of Theorem 2 and (2⌊log2(
1+2ϵ
2ϵ )⌋ − 1)ϵ ∈ [ 14 ; 12 ] in the claim of Theorem 3 respectively.
4.2. Selfish load balancing
In this section we analyze the applications of Second Order Nash equilibria to the load balancing game, the special case
of the KP model in which all the machines have identical speed.
Given a state s, let Lj(s) be the load of machine j in s, we define T (s) = maxj=1,...,m Lj(s) and t(s) = minj=1,...,m Lj(s) as
the maximum and the minimum completion time respectively of themmachines in state s. For any (s, s′)-path π in GG, let
M(π) be the set of machines involved in the improving steps defining such a path. We denote as TM(π)(s) (resp. tM(π)(s)) the
maximum (resp. minimum) completion time on the machines belonging toM(π) in state s.
The following lemma is just a restatement of two well-known properties of improving steps in the KP model first shown
in [20,18], respectively.
Lemma 6. For any (s, s′)-path π in GG it holds TM(π)(s) ≥ TM(π)(s′) and tM(π)(s) ≤ tM(π)(s′).
We show that no proper Second Order Nash equilibrium exists for the load balancing game, i.e., N(G) collapses to the set
of Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4. Let G be any load balancing game, it holds N(G) = N0(G).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, consider a state s ∈ N(G)\N0(G). Clearly, we have P(s) ≠ ∅. Consider a player pi ∈ P(s)
using a machine j in s such that Lj(s) is maximal, let s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i be the state reached when pi performs the improving step of
leaving machine j in favor of a machine j′ such that Lj′(s) = t(s) and consider a state s′′ ∈ ρ(s′)k∗ . By applying Lemma 6, we
have t(s) = tM(s,s′′)(s) ≤ tM(s,s′′)(s′′), thus no machine j′′ ∈ M(s, s′′) exists such that Lj′′(s) > Lj(s) because otherwise there
would have been an improving step for some players using machine j′′ in s thus contradicting the maximality of Lj(s). This
shows that Lj(s) = TM(s,s′′)(s) ≥ TM(s,s′′)(s′′). Since we have ωi(s) = TM(s,s′′)(s) ≥ TM(s,s′′)(s′′) ≥ ωi(s′′), s cannot be a proper
Second Order Nash equilibrium. 
As a consequence of the above theorem, for this model we are in a situation in which there is no need to study the
performances of Second Order Nash equilibria since they are just Nash equilibria. However, aswe have seen in Proposition 2,
convergence towards these equilibria may be affected. Moreover, as we illustrate in the following example, since Second
Order improving steps are based on a comparison of the current state with the worst one which can be reached at the end
of the evolution, the use extended rationality can potentially lead the game towards better Nash equilibria.
Example 1. Consider an instance of the load balancing game in which we havemmachines and 2m− 2 jobs. In particular,
there are m − 1 jobs of length 1, one job of length 1 − 1m , one job of length 3m and m − 3 jobs of length 1m . Now, suppose
that the game is in the state represented in Fig. 6 and that the following sequence of improving steps takes place: the job of
length 1− 1m migrates to machinem, all them− 3 jobs of length 1m migrate to machinem− 1 thus filling it up to the value
1 and finally a job of length 1 migrates from machine 1 to machine m thus leading the game to the state depicted in Fig. 7.
Such a state is the worst Nash equilibrium and yields a makespan equal to 2 − 1m . The best Nash equilibrium (and optimal
solution for the underlying optimization problem), depicted in Fig. 8, yields a makespan equal to 1+ 2m .
We show that the use of extended rationality can avoid such an undesired convergence to the worst Nash equilibrium.
Let s be the state depicted in Fig. 6, s′ be the worst Nash equilibrium and pi be the player owning the job of length 1 − 1m .
By using the sequence of migrations described above, we have that s′ ∈ ρ(s)k∗i and ωi(s) < ωi(s′). Thus, even though s is
not a Second Order Nash equilibrium, we have that, by applying her extended rationality, pi will renounce to perform her
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Fig. 7. The worst Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 8. The best Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 9. A ‘‘bad’’ instance of the load balancing game.




m , thus showing that several improving steps leaving state s does not belong to the Second Order state graph of the
game. It is not difficult to see that, if players act this way, the game will finally reach the best Nash equilibrium. There is,
indeed, still one case (depicted in Fig. 9) in which neither the use of the extended rationality can prevent the game from
reaching the worst Nash equilibrium. This happens when the player owning the job of length 1 migrates from machine m
to machinem− 1.
However, this bad situation could be avoided if such a player renounced to her improving step conscious of the fact that
this would lead the game towards a better outcome for her. This assumption introduces a further extension in our definition
of rational agents. We formalize this idea in the next section.
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5. Other notions of selfish farsighted behavior
Whatwe have seen so far are agents always comparing the current situationwith theworst SecondOrder equilibrium the
game can reach after their improving steps.Wewill call these agents prudent agents because if there is a chance ofworsening
their payoffs they will stay quiet and will not perform any improving step. Clearly, it is also possible to consider rash agents
choosing to perform improving steps when there is a chance of reaching a good equilibrium for them, thus comparing with
the best Second Order equilibrium. When considering rash agents, the definition of Second Order Nash equilibria becomes
the following.
Definition 3 (Rash Agents). Let G be a convergent game. The set Nk(G) = {s ∈ S : ∀pi ∈ P(s) and ∀s′ ∈ ρ(s)1i and ∀s′′ ∈
Nk(G) such that s′′ ∈ ρNk(G)(s′)k it holds ωi(s) ≤ ωi(s′′)} is the set of all the Second Order k-Nash equilibria of game G, for
any integer k ≥ 0.
As we have seen at the end of the previous section, extended rationality can also mean that a player eventually renounce
to perform an improving step if she can benefit from such a choice. Thus, if Definitions 1 and 3 model equilibria for
prudent and rash agents respectively, we now propose other two definitions that will characterize equilibria for two classes
of even more farsighted agents that we will call patient prudent and patient rash agents respectively. To this aim, we
first need to introduce the following notation. For any set of equilibrium states E ⊆ S, let ρs′,E(s)k be the set of states
which can be reached from s in k steps in GG without using the edge (s, s′), worsti(E, s′) = maxs′′∈E:s′′∈ρE (s′)k{ωi(s′′)}
be the worst payoff for player pi yielded by any equilibrium in E which can be reached in k steps starting from s′ and
worsti(E, s, s′) = maxs′′∈E:s′′∈ρs′,E (s)k{ωi(s′′)} be the worst payoff for player pi yielded by any equilibrium in E which can be
reached in k steps starting from s without using the edge (s, s′). Analogously, define besti(E, s′) = mins′′∈E:s′′∈ρE (s′)k{ωi(s′′)}
and besti(E, s, s′) = mins′′∈E:s′′∈ρs′,E (s)k{ωi(s′′)}. Considering patient prudent agents and patient rash agents respectively, the
definitions of the set of Second Order Nash equilibria become the following ones.
Definition 4 (Patient Prudent Agents). Let G be a convergent game. The set Nk(G) = {s ∈ S : ∀pi ∈ P(s) such that
worsti(Nk(G), s′) ≤ worsti(Nk(G), s, s′)} is the set of all the Second Order k-Nash equilibria of game G, for any integer
k ≥ 0.
Definition 5 (Patient Rash Agents). Let G be a convergent game. The set Nk(G) = {s ∈ S : ∀pi ∈ P(s) such that
besti(Nk(G), s′) < besti(Nk(G), s, s′)} is the set of all the Second Order k-Nash equilibria of game G, for any integer k ≥ 0.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we tried to give an impulse towards the definition of a better model for selfish rational agents by exploiting
a simple and intuitive observation. If starting from a state s in which a set of players P(s) are unhappy of their payoffs, the
game can reach an equilibrium s′ in which for any pi ∈ P(s) it holds ωi(s) < ωi(s′), then it is rational to consider s as an
equilibrium state, since all players who have an incentive in deviating from s discover that such an incentive is just illusory.
This view point leads us to Second Order Nash equilibria which, in spite of a simple intuitive nature, required not trivial
arguments in order to be captured in a formal definition.
A well-studied problem in Game Theory has been that of reducing the set of Nash equilibria of a game by eliminating
those which can be considered in some sense ‘‘irrational’’. This process can surely provide an improvement on the price of
anarchy of Nash equilibria. However, no benefits can be achieved in all those games in which the price of stability of Nash
equilibria is too high. Our definition of Second Order Nash equilibria has the property of expanding the set of Nash equilibria
thus being able to potentially improve on the price of stability.
We provided different types of applications of Second Order Nash equilibria to games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the Wardrop model and the KP model. We believe that our work can open a new window on this young and fascinating
research field, by widening the notion of rationality of players.
A lot of open questions are thus introduced by this vision. The first one is certainly that of giving further validation
of Second Order equilibria by using them together with other known equilibria and presenting good applications. To this
aim, the definition of Second Order Sink equilibria seems to be a promising research direction. Moreover, there is the
important issue of understanding the power of different ordering strategies in influencing the performances of SecondOrder
equilibria. An interesting question can be also that of trying to understand if the use of SecondOrder equilibria can lead faster
convergence and/or convergence towards better states. In the paper we have only considered impatient prudent agents. A
final open issue is certainly that of analyzing the other three possible definitions for rational agents.
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